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Hippocratic Data Streams - Concepts, Architectures and Issues 
XI. H. Ali 11. Y. ElTabakh E. Bertiilo 
Department of Computer Science. Purdue University 
(m12ali. meltabak. bertino)8cs.purclue.edu 
Abstract 
Th,e goal o i  o.n Hippocratic DBhIS i s  t o  preserve the  
p7.ivacy of data witlj.out m,u,ch sac,rificing perform,a,n,ce. 
I n  this  paper.. we a,ddress problen?. of cle~!eloping privacy- 
pres~r..~lin.g  system.^ i n t o  the  m o r e  chollen.ging con,tezt o,f 
doto streonrs. W e  con,trmst dato st7eo711s t o  trodition.al 
dotobases a11.d ide7l.tify tire n e w  cha l l en ,g~s  posed by data 
streo7ns. W e  disctrss elr:o,nrples of stream.ing opplica~tion.s 
771. which. priva,cy and  security issues  ore cr.uc~:o.L. 1Ve pro- 
pose a v is ion~ary architectural design of 1 1 . 0 ~  (L Hippo- 
c7atic D a t a  S t reom Man,agen~en.t  S y s t e m  (HDSAdS) m,ay 
look like. W e  iden.tzfy sellera1 open rese(lrc11. directi0n.s 
u!ll.ere privacy preservin.g issues  mee t  t1l.e dotu stream,in,g 
paradignr. 
1. Introduction 
Recent advances in pervasi~e computing and sen- 
sor netn;orks coinbilled with techniques for stream data 
processing 11. 13. 16: 23, 251 h a ~ e  made possible not. 
only acquiring and processing large amount of data 
from our environment, but also extracting relevant in- 
forma.t.ion and kno\vledge fi-om such data.  TVe can ex- 
pect unprecedent innorative applications arising from 
the massive deployment. of such technology in 1a.rge va- 
riety of domains. such as ui-ban planniiig. environinen- 
tal protection. 11oineland security. health care. enter- 
taininent. education (19. 28, 291. Enabling such a. vi- 
sion requires 11on;ever addressing increasillg privacy and 
confidentiality requirements in that \rery often stream 
data  convey infornlatioil related to indi\~iduals or in- 
forination that are critical to  organizations. Though 
stream data illanageinei~t systems 11i\\:e been exten- 
s i ~ e l j -  investigated by the research cominunity, the fo- 
cus has been on topics such as quer5- processing[lG, 251 
and ~ \ ~ ~ t e r i n a r k i n g  [27]. Issues related to  privacy and 
confidentia.lity, and security inore in general, have yet 
to  be even understood. 
In this paper we aim a t  developing a first definition 
of the privacy problem and to establish tlle main princi- 
ples underlying the development of privacy-preserving 
techniques for stream data manageinent systems. BJ- 
refer to  such systems as Hippocratic data stream, m,an,- 
a,gem,en.t  system.^ (HDSMS): by borronring the term 
firstly ii~troduced by Agrawal et al. [4]: to einpliasize 
the responsibility, in pa.rt iinposed by existing laws 
and regulations, of protecting tlle privacy of the  user's 
dat,a. As part  of their initial work, Agrawal and al. 
defined soine principles t,hat should guide the devel- 
opment of an Hippocra.t,ic Database Management Sys- 
tein (DBRlS). However: such principles were referred to  
coinientional DBMS. TVe believe that  stream data man- 
agement systeills are more crucial t o  privacy and have 
challenges t,llat go beyong the challenges identified in 
the coiltext of coi~veiltioilal DBMS. 
1.1. Key Differences between databases 
and data streams 
The most fundainental difference between tradi- 
tional databases and data streains is that the latter 
are uilbounded sequences of data continuousl~~ arriy- 
ing according to  a specific data  rate. Such a difference 
iinpacts many features and components of DBMS ar- 
chitectures. such as the types of query that are sup- 
ported and execution strategies for such queries. Here 
we elaborate in more details on such differences: 
1. Q v e r y  types. I11 com~entional DBR,IS queries are 
snap-shot queries that. ret'rieve data  from a con- 
sistent. state of the database a t  a specific time. BJ- 
contra.st, queries applied to data streams are usu- 
ally contiiluous queries [lo]. Coiltinuous queries 
keep running as long as they are registered in the 
systein to  consider the ne\vl~l-incoming data.  Con- 
tinuous queries inalte use of the notion of sliding 
windows [22]. A sliding window liinits the query to  
the nlost recent portion of the st,reain that  is long 
u: time units. 
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2 .  Access m.et/rods. I11 com~ent~ioi~al DBAIS: the 
database records are usually accessed randomly 
wit11 no notioil of data order. I11 data streams, 
n:e usually cannot afford illore than one sequ.en,- 
tial pass over the data stream. Aloreover, once a 
data iten1 passes, the s?;st,ein either explicitly pro- 
cesses this data 01- it loses it for ever. 
Incre7n,en.ta.l processin~g. Coilveiltional DBMS ac- 
cept the user's query, process the query over the 
current silapshot of the data: and ternlinate the 
process once the result is returned to tlle user. 
In the case of data streams, the systeill streams 
tlle output as ~vell it streams the input. A newly- 
inconling data iten1 triggers the execution of the 
query plan operators to  in.c~em.en,tally add the ef- 
fect of this data iten1 to the query answer. Blocking 
operators. e.g.: join, group-by. a.nd aggregates, are 
approximat.ed wit11 11011-blocking operators t'hat. 
are incrementally evaluated to  obtaiil approxi- 
mate: but earl!;: results. 
4. Approxin~a~te a.n.su1ers. Conventional DBMS usu- 
ally return exact. ansxvers to  queries or answers 
with high accuracy. Ho~ve~e r :  when dealing with 
da.ta streams: sonle level of approxilnatioil can 
be acceptable in order to deal with the linlited 
CPU t.iine in fi-ont of the high arrival rates of data 
streanls and to make up for t.he bounded illenlory 
resources in front. of the infiniteness of the data 
stream. 
1.2. Challenges 
The differences we have outlined in the previous sub- 
section introduce import.ant challeilges for the devel- 
opnleilt of Hippocratic. DBAIS for streail1 data. The 
data. streaming environi~~ent is a highly-demanding en- 
vironment where continuous queries are executed over 
strean1 data t'hat are usually generated at  high rates. 
Contiiluous query processing requires highly efficient. 
query processors to  avoid loosing inucll of the input 
data. The liillited CPU time is shared ainong the out- 
st,a.nding coiltiiluous queries to process data as they 
evolve. The enforceillent of security and privacy mea- 
sures 1lla.y trigger hea~y-\~~eight.  processes tha.t inay 
heavily affect performance. As a result, security and 
privacy mecl~anisi~~s sllould be optimized for speed and 
should be tuned to work in a. single sequent,ial pass over 
the streanled data. 
To be suitable for data strea,ins, securit.y and pri- 
vacy illecllanisnls should be able to  process the stream 
data incrementally. A strean1 systenl coiltiiluously re- 
ceives new data. and expires old da.ta. that  a,re not longer 
of interest to  any query. Security and privacy mecha- 
nisms sllould take into consideration the effect of new 
data and: meanwhile, should fa.de the effect of expiring 
data. A,Ioreover, security and privacy-preserving mech- 
anisins sllould be able to  run on top of approxima.te 
or incomplete data. instead of the exact data to  make 
up for any data loss. In case of approximate or incom- 
plete data, approxima.tions should not be skewed in a. 
way that reveals the sensitive conlponents of individ- 
ual records. 
The voluininous data that is streanled in and 
streamed out increases the system's vulnerability t,o se- 
curity a.ttacks. For example, the higher the nuinber is 
of data. encrypted with the same key, the easier it is to  
conlproinise t,llat key. Security mecllanisnls should ainl 
at releasing no sensitive inforination eve11 a.fter long pe- 
riods of opera,tion. 
1.3. Contributions 
In this paper we address the problenl of privacy- 
preserving data nlanagement tecllniques for streain 
data. Such problem. already challenging for conven- 
tional database systems, is much more difficult in a 
context characterized by huge amounts of fast arriv- 
ing data and by strong performance requirements. The 
inajor contributioils of this paper can be summarized 
as follows: 
1. Mie shift the problenl of privacy assurance froin 
conventional databases to  the more challenging 
paradigm of data streams. 
2. We revisit and substantiall? extend the pri- 
vacy principles. initially devised foi conventional 
databases, in the context of stream data. In par- 
ticular. we introduce two more principles that are 
stream-specific. 
3. MTe identify the nla,jor cha.llenges tha.t, are t,o be 
addressed in t,he design of an Hippocratic data 
strea.m illanagement systems. 
4. We develop an architectural design of a Hippo- 
cratic data stream ~~lanagement system (HDShIS) 
that addresses those challenges and can be used as 
a reference framework for research in the area of 
security and privacy techniques for strean1 data 
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol- 
lo\vs: Section 2 presents twelve principles represent- 
ing the main requirements that should guide tlle de- 
velopment of privacy-preserving nlanagenlent systems 
for stream data. Section 3 enlphasizes the principles of 
Hippocratic data streams through sonle example appli- 
cations. Section 4 discusses the challenges that must be 
addressed in the developnlent of an HDSAIS. Section 5 
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 resents our design of a data streain inanageinellt sys- 
tem that coinplies with the principles of Hippocratic 
data streams. Section G overviews related work. Fi- 
nail!-. Section 7 concludes the paper and gives some 
guidelines future research. 
2. Principles of Hippocratic Stream 
Data Management Systems 
In this section. we present twelve principles that 
guide the behavior of Hippocratic stream data man- 
agemcnt. The first ten principles were initially pro- 
posed for conventional database systems. and we re- 
visit them hcre ill the context of streain data.  The last 
two are iiovel and have been devised specifically for 
streain data.  
1. Purpose Specification.. This principle states that 
the purpose for which the data  is collected needs 
to  be collect,ed and associated with the data it- 
self. I11 data streams, the purpose of data collec- 
tion may change over time. At the extreme, the 
purpose of the data  is streamed continuo~isly into 
the system with the streainiilg of the data.  
2.  Consent. This principle guarantees that  the pur- 
pose fbr wh~ch  the da ta  is collected has the consent 
of the user. As ill coilventional database systems. 
a data streain inanageinent systein must maintain 
the consent of the user over the lifetime of the 
stream. 
3. Lim.ited Collection. Data, collection should be lim- 
ited t o  the minimum amount of data t11a.t satis- 
fies the user's specified purposes. There are sev- 
eral challenges one has to  address in order to  
limit tlle dat,a collection in a data. streain manage- 
inent system. For example, streams with no asso- 
ciated queries should not st,reanled into the  sys- 
tem a.t all; stream da ta  items that  are of no inter- 
est to any query are filtered a t  t.he system's input 
buffers. Additionally, since the  streailling environ- 
inent is dynainic, i.e., existing queries expire and 
new queries arrive, rules and filters that  the sys- 
tem uses t o  limit. the data  collection change dy- 
na.mically. 
4.  Lzmzted Use. This principle ensures that the data is 
used by queries that  do not violate the purposes of 
tlle collected data.  In a data stream managelllent 
system. a t  the time of query registration. admis- 
sion control policies are applied to  accept or to  re- 
ject the query. More flexibly, if the adinission con- 
trol detects that  a query will violate the purpose 
of the data,  then the admission control can nego- 
tiate the query delllands n ~ i t h  the querj-'s owner 
instead of rejecting it. 
5. Lim.ited Disclosure. The system is not allowed t o  
release any infornlation to  a. third party that is 
outside the system n~ithout the owner's approval. 
In data streams: limited disclosure has the saine 
meaning as  in con~~entional databases with one ad- 
ditional challenge. A iniiliinunl quality of the re- 
leased data should be included in the owner's con- 
sent? and when t,he system releases da.ta t,o a third 
party: the minilnuin data quality has to  be en- 
sured. Otherwise, tlle third pa.rty may not get a 
true image of the s t~ea in .  
6. Limited Retention.. Limited ret,ention ilecessitates 
the iininedia.te deletion of the user's data once tlle 
associa.ted purpose is fulfilled. To map the same 
concept t o  data. st,reams, the user's data should not 
be inaintaiiled beyond the largest time-window of 
any query tha.t accesses t.he stream. 
7 .  Accuracy. The accuracj- of a database systein 
means 110~- accurate and up-to-date the informa- 
tion stored in the database is. For data streams. 
accuracy has two interpretations: (a) the accuracy 
of the approximate version of the stream inside 
the systein and (b) the query output delay. which 
is measured by the time required for a data item 
t o  appear in the output (i.e.. to  bring the output 
up-to-date). 
8.  Safety. Saftey entails tlle adoption the security 
ineasuies protecting sensitive data from various 
types of attack. The challenge in data streams 
. is represented by tlle huge amount of data that 
needs t o  be secured. hforeover. security mecha- 
nisms should consider the scarcity of resources 
in the streaming environment by avoiding CPU- 
intensive operations. 
9. Openness. Openness allows the individual to  
nihoin tlle data are related to  access all infor- 
ination about himself stored in the database. I11 
data streain systems. openness is very difficult t o  
achieve because of the continuous change in the 
streain data due to the arrival and the expiratloll 
of data.  A streain ow-nei should be able t o  retrieve 
the data that are actually stieained inside the sys- 
tem and to  compare these data with its original 
data.  Then. the stleaill on-iler can decide h o ~ v  sat- 
isfactory the system's sampling rate is. 
0. Complzance As foi coilventional databases. coin- 
pliance ineans making sure that interested sub- 
jects. for example data owners. be able to verify 
that the system complies with the privacy princi- 
ples. At ally time instant. the streain owner should 
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be able to  track the query answers that are based 
on his own streain to  check that his privacy re- 
quirements are met. Verifying the compliance of 
a data streain nlanagement system is a hard task 
given the huge ainount of output data that are 
strean~ed out of the system over time. 
Faithful Representatzon. Because of the scarcity of 
system resources. the querj- processor inay not be 
able to  catch up with the stream arrival rates. 
Consequently, some data may drop fro111 the in- 
put buffers. A Hippociatic data streain inanage- 
inent system guarantees that the processed data 
are a faithful representative subset of the origi- 
nal stream data. Data dropping should (a) treat 
all streams fairly and (b) result in a uniform ran- 
dom sample of the original streams. No specific 
streams or stream values should be repeatedlj- ig- 
nored either accidentally or intentionally. 
12.  Minimum QoS. A Hippocrat'ic data streain man- 
agenlent system should guarantee a m.in.imum. 
Quality of Service (QoS) per registered query. This 
principle assures that the security and the privacy 
inechanisins do not overload the system resources. 
Adoption of this principle also prevents den,ial of 
service attacks where the system accepts a huge 
nuinber of queries that are beyond the system's 
processing capabilities. According to this princi- 
ple, a query is not accepted unless the systein can 
secure enough resources for the processing of this 
query. 
3. Applications of Hippocratic Data 
Streams 
Allnost every data streaming application has solne 
relevant privacy and security requirements. Honiever: 
some a,pplications are particularly challenghing be- 
cause privacy requirements are dyna.mic and are 
strea.ined t o  the systeln with the streanling of the data. 
itself. Here we briefly discuss three such applications 
a,nd identify the main challenges they pose. 
3.1. Streams of Video Frames 
A video clip is a streain of video frames that are dis- 
]>layed in a timely fashion. Users are allowed to \lieu 
video clips based on some access pernlissions. The sim- 
plest case IS either to grant or to reject the user's re- 
quest to  view the entire video clip. Alternatively. the 
user is authorized to view a subset of the video frames 
and is prohibited froin viewing other frames that have 
highel levels of confidentiality. These two cases can be 
handled efficiently through traditional access control 
policies that operate on the frame level as its basic 
granularity. 
Our application scenario assumes that every user is 
allowed to vien- the entire video clip after blurring soine 
portions of the video frames that contain confidential 
information, e.g , faces of the people. In this case. the 
trajectories of the moving faces that have special ac- 
cess control policies are streamed to the system with 
the streaming of the video frames. Then, access control 
inechanisins are applied onliile to  blur specific portions 
of each video frame based on the user's access perinis- 
sion. 
3.2. Streams of Spatiotemporal Data 
Assulne that a data. stream management system 
(DSMS) receives a streain of spatiotemporal readings 
that represent the locations of inoving vehicles at spe- 
cific time instants. Based on a. continuous query, the 
DSMS feeds each vehicle with information about its 
nearest service st'ations: e.g., gas stations: restaurants: 
and hospitals. Also, the DSMS inay release a vehicle's 
information to  its nearest service st,a,tions for the sake 
of advertisements provided that the system gets the 
vehicle's consent. The DSMS can barga.in on behalf of 
the vehicle's owner with the service stat,ions for a bet- 
ter service with less cost. 
In the above scenario' the system maintains informa.- 
tion about tile users' vehicles and the service stations. 
The systein a.ut.11orizes only close-by stations to adver- 
tise themselves to a vehicle and hides the vehicle's in- 
forination from other stations to  avoid that the vehicle 
be spammed. Each user specifies what type of informa- 
tion about lliinself can be released, e.g., location, name: 
and preferences. The user also tells his notion of dis- 
tance, i.e., lio~v near the nearest service stations should 
be. Service stations have the notion of confidentiality 
as well. The prices of each station inay be kept confi- 
dential to allou~ the sjist,en~ exclusively to bargain for a 
better rate. Also' a. service station inay require its in- 
forination to be released 011157 t'o specific types of ve- 
hicles or to vehicles with specific preferences. Finally, 
it is the system's responsibility to ma.tch the require- 
inents of both the vehicle and the station. 
3.3. Streams of Retail Transactions 
The online processing of retail transactions is a. rich 
area with respect, to ~vhich to  explore the functional- 
ities of an HDSMS. A retail transaction cont,a.ins in- 
forination about the sold items: their quantities, their 
prices, the customer information, and the method of 
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Figure 1. Shared execution of queries over the 
same data stream. 
ent pieces of information. For example; a cashier is not 
allowed to  view any inforination once a transa.ction is 
complete. A store's 1nana.ger should access only the in- 
format,ion of his local store. The inailagement of the 
retail store series has the a.uthorit); to  view the infor- 
mation of all stores and, moreover; to  grant access to  
individuals. A third party ma!; be responsible for pro- 
cessing the cust~oiner's payment. Research centers are 
authorized to  access a 17iew that is defined over the 
data. for analysis purposes only. A customer should be 
able t o  specify his confidentiality requirements, for how 
long t o  keep his 0\\~i1 data,  a,nd whether or not to  use 
his da ta  in analysis and advertisenlent purposes. 
In the above scenario. man); entities interact t o  corn- 
plete a. single transaction. A11 HDSMS has the responsi- 
bility of enforcing all the security and the privacy rules 
of each entity. An HDShIS is globally trusted and is be- 
lieved to  protect the right,s of retail stores, customers 
and other parties that  are involved in the transactions. 
4. Challenges 
Hippocratic data stleain systems pose several chal- 
lenging probleins He1 e we elaboi ate on these chal- 
lenges. outline posslble appioaclies and identify open 
research dii ections. 
4.1. Shared Execution 
In a data strea.in system: a user 111aj7 execute a query 
that accesses inultiple streains; also inultiple users may 
execute queries that  access the same stream. Each user 
has certain authorizations and restrictions over each 
streain. One of the main challenges in this respect is 
how to  enforce authorizations without degrading the 
system's performance. For example, the a.uthorizations 
that  a.re coinnlon among the current users should be ap- 
plied once instead of applying them to  each user sepa.- 
rat,ely. One possible solution is that  the streain owner 
creates a view for each user that  determines the ac- 
cess permissions of the user's queries. I11 the create view 
stat,ement, the stream owner specifies the following pa- 
rameters: 
1. A set of attributes. This set of attributes restricts 
the scope of the user's queries. 
2. A ininiinum sampling rate. The streain owner 
grants the user a ininimun~ sainpling rate t o  en- 
sure that  the user's queries capture the ininimuin 
required behavior of the strean] that  is necessary 
for these queries 
3. A ina.ximum sainpling rate. The streain owner re- 
stricts the amount of inforination that  a query can 
see through a inaximuin sainpling ra.te. 
4. A inaxiinum size of a sliding window. This param- 
eter limits 110117 far a query can go in the past. The 
query must operate over a window that  is of equal 
or less size. 
5. A set of filters. The stream oxviler has the author- 
ity to  apply a specific filter over his data before 
it is fed t o  a query. For example. a retail store 
may prevent certain queries from accessing trans- 
actions with special iteins or with prices over a 
certain amount. 
Figure l a  illustrates a naive approach under which 
the input streain is pushed into the system's input 
buffer and then the output from the buffer fans out to  
ea.ch query based on its access pern~issions. The  buffer 
manager feeds each query Qi with streain readings over 
the most recent time-window w according to  its speci- 
fied mininlum and inaxiinunl sainpling rates and win- 
dow W;. St,reain t,uples are projected to  eliminate any 
unauthorized attributes and are filtered out t o  limit, . 
the a.ccess t o  authorized values only. This 'pproach suf- 
fers fro111 duplication in the input buffers of outstand- 
ing queries where a single tuple is fed to  many queries. 
If no security and privacy techniques are in place, the 
syst,ein \vould use a single input buffer per streain that 
feeds all queries a~i t l l  input tuples. The inajor challenge 
here is t,o avoid the duplication overhead in the query 
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Figrire l ( b )  illustrates the case where one shared 
buffer is used for all queries. Tlle shared input buffer 
should include all the attributes that are accessed by all 
queries and should be long enough to satisfy the max- 
imum window size, i.e., inax(TV1, W z ,  . . .: 1,T;',,). ivith 
the highest required sainple rate. The key issue is to 
avoid the materialization of the view of each query and 
t,o use one global view that is shared among all queries. 
4.2. Dynamic Change of Security and Pri- 
vacy Preferences 
The securitj- and privacy ]>references can be 
streamed with the streaming of the data to indicate 
the piivacy preferences of the current portion of the 
stream. Recall the example of video streams in Sec- 
tion 3.1 where the trajectory of the objects that needs 
protection is streamed with the streaining of the video 
frames. The dynamic and continuous change in security 
and privacy preferences places two major challenges: 
1. Syn~chronization between. the stream, tuples and th,eir 
a,ssociated preferences. A lag betxveen the stream 
tuples and their preferences can undermine data 
priva.cy. Ii~lagine the problem of blurring a por- 
tion of the video frame after the object that is re- 
quired to he prot,ected is already displayed. The 
lag between t.he strea.m tuples and associated pref- 
erence nlay occur due to network delays betm~een 
the streain source and the system. 
2 .  Dyn,am.ic query optim.ization~. Certain ol>tiiniza- 
tions take place to  tune the query performance 
based 011 the security and privacy preferences. A 
change in these preferences triggers a change in the 
query plans that  a.re executed over the stream. The 
online optimization of queries should make sure to 
avoid n:asting the systems resources at  run-time. 
Some work has been conducted to  reorganize the 
operators dynamically in the context of the Tele- 
graph project based 011 the concept of Eddies [7]. 
4.3. Stream Ciphers 
Stream ciphers, e.g., [20] are used to encrypt and 
decrypt stream da.ta. The huge amount of data that is 
con\reyed in a data stream requires careful key m.an,age- 
m.en.t. The longer the data sequence that, is encrypted 
with the  same encryption key, the easier it is t,o coin- 
promise that key. The key should be changed frequently 
or generated using a pseudo randoin generator that  ap- 
proximates the one-time-pad technique. 
Key syn.chron.ization is another challenge in stream 
ciphers. The streaming enviroilment is lossy by na.ture 
and, hence, stream tuples drop froin input buffers if no 
sufficient resources are allocated for these tuples. Ell- 
cryption techniques should take into consideration pos- 
sible loss of data that may desynch~on~zze the decryp- 
tion keg from the stream ciphel. Some work has been 
initiated in [5] to develop slef-synchronizing stream ci- 
phers that tolerate possible data loss. 
Stream ciphers should be tuned to provide fast 
encryption and decryption operations while avoiding 
CPU-intensive operations The objective of stream ci- 
phers is to  secure streains without coinpeting with 
other system's functionalities for systei11 resources. The 
system's total throughput should be nliniinally affected 
by the encryption and decryption processes. 
4.4. Compliance 
A11 import,ant mechanism supportiilg proof of pri- 
vacy con~pliance by the system is represented by logs 
of audit trails. Such logs are generated by the DBMS 
upon ea.ch data access and give users the ability to 
t,rack all the operations that hasre touched their data. 
Users can investigate the audit trails a t  any time to  ver- 
ify t,he compliance of the system to  their privacy pref- 
erences. One possible solution to achieve compliance 
and to  inonitor users' queries is to generate, for ev- 
ery user, log entries on the form: (Query, Item, ts, . . .). 
Such a log entry records t.he query issued by the user, 
the item(s) accessed by the query, and the t,in~estainp 
a t  which the query took place. Notice that the item can 
refer to  various granularities of data,  e.g., attribute, tu- 
ple, or table. Other information ca.n be added to  record 
the purpose of the query and a reference to  the user's 
consent. 
In data streain systems, audit trails are extremely 
huge. Therefore, storii~g the infinite data composing 
the original st,rean~ is not feasible. As a result, logging 
the answer to multiple queries over data streams would 
be impossible. Ail alternative solution is t o  store audit. 
trails a t  coarser granularities. 111 coi~trast o  recording a 
data, item and the t i inestan~p a t  which t,he item is ac- 
cessed, a lazy approach can be adopted a.ccording to  
which the log records a stream range and the period of 
time ( t s , ~ , , ~ ,  t send)  over which tlie streain range is ac- 
cessed. This approach reduces the accura.cy of the a.udit 
trails but addresses the problem of the liinited mem- 
ory space. The audit tra.ils can be enhanced with ex- 
t,ra summaries to sketch the result that is returned to  
the query over the associated range of the stream. The 
log entries that are generated have the form: (Query. 
strem-ran,ge: t s s tur t ,  t ~ ~ , ~ d :  Sum.marzes, . . .). 
Another challenge in the data, streaining environ- 
inent is to produce the audit, t,rails online without 
significantly degrading the perforinailce of continuous 
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Figure 2. Global filters. 
queries. The coarser the granularity over which the 
query answer is logged, t-he less load is pla.ced over the 
system. 
4.5. Limited Collection 
Limiting the data that is streamed into t,he system 
t,o t'he minimum possible has two illail1 adva,ntages: (1) 
it decreases the processing load of the systein and (2) it 
supports complia,nce to the min.im.um collection princi- 
ple. Simply, if a. strea.111 has no associated query, it re- 
nlaiils inactive and is not streamed into the syst,em. 
Once a query is registered at  t,he system, all its in- 
act,ive target streams are initialized and are streamed 
into the system. A warn-up period that is equal to  the 
length of the query's sliding window is required to fill 
up the query's input buffers. Similarly, ally att,ributes 
in the stream tha,t are of no interest to  any query are 
not streamed into the system. 
In contrast to t,he above strea.m.-level or a.ttribute- 
level data collection: the tuple-level data collection is 
more cl~allenging. The systein should be able to de- 
cide whether a single strea.111 tuple is of interest to  any 
outstanding query. A global filter is pushed at  the sys- 
tem's input buffer to take out, as early as possible; any 
streail1 tuples that do not satisfy the select,ion predi- 
cates of all outstanding queries. Figure 2 illustra,tes the 
case where a global filter for three queries is pushed to 
the input buffer level to  take out tuples that are of no 
interest t,o the three queries. Puslling filt,ers to  the in- 
put buffers requires the buffer manager to  be equipped 
urith additional processing capabilities. 
4.6. Limited Retention 
The principle of limited retention, in traditioilal 
databases is relatively stra.ightforu7ard coinpa,red t o  
data stream systems. I11 traditional da.tabases; once a 
data. iten1 fulfills its associated purpose, it is deleted 
from the database and from tlle logs as well. Conse- 
quently, the da.ta item is no longer visible t o  ally query. 
I11 data st1ea.m systenls, data are not persistent. 
They ca,n be in the system's input buffers, the queries' 
input buffers. 01. queued in one or illore query plail 01,- 
erators. Moreover; tlle effect of stream data is reflected 
in the maint,a.ined summaries over the stream. To com- 
ply with lim.ited reten,tion. principle t,he HDSXIS lias to  
ensure the following: 
Queries win.dow size: Cont~inuous queries usually 
rest,rict their interest t,o a certain x~~indoiir over the 
st,reain. The retention tiine for a. st,ream lias to be 
lasger than the query window size. If t,he query 
urindow size is larger than the stream retention 
time: then the a,dnlission control conlponent llas 
t o  either reject the query or negotiate nrit.11 tlle 
query's owner to  reduce the \vindoii: size. 
Fad2n.g sum.m.ar-ies: Streams may llave sunimal.ies 
built on top of them. Wit'h the retention tiine prin- 
ciple, tlle time dinlensioil has to  be considered 
while building the summa.ries such that. the effect 
of the tuples sllould fade over time unt,il the ef- 
fect disappears a.fter the specified retention time. 
Dynamzc lzmzted retentzon: Streams are contiiluous 
and the retention period may change over time. 
The system should provide a mechanism to read- 
just the existing data based on the neiv retention 
period 
4.7. Limited Disclosure 
A stream omriler has the right to instruct the data 
strean1 systein to release its data to  a third party to 
obtain a specific service. For example. a m o ~ i n g  vehi- 
cle requests the system to release its inforination to  tlle 
nearest service station or a retail store requests a re- 
lease of its inforinatio~l to a research center. In the con- 
text of data streams, we identify the follou-ing tn-o ba- 
sic challenges: 
1. Fa.ithfu1 disclosure. If the systein is to  disclose the 
user's information; it should disclose then) cor- 
rectly. Iilla,giile an overloaded da,ta. stream system 
that releases the information of a reta.il store to  
a research center with low sampling rate. Xlissing 
tuples in the released strea.m can negatively af- 
fect the provided service. Tlle systein should be 
able to  conlinit to release a good-qua.lity image of 
the user's data to the intended third party. 
2. Tzmed-out dzsclosure. The systein should be able 
to accept timed-out requests from the user to re- 
lease his information. For example. a ino~,ing ve- 
hicle allows the system to release its illforillation 
to  the nearest neighbor. As the vehicle moves. its 
nearest neighbor changes. The s)-stem should be 
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service station is not recognized as the \:chicle's 
nearest neighbor. 
4.8. Quality of Service 
Traditional databases provide exact and accurate 
a,nswers. On the other hand, data streanls are tuned 
for approximate answers to  alleviate the bursty iia- 
t.ure of data. strea.111~ that usua.lly arrive in higli rates. 
The quality of service (QoS) principle assess "hon- ap- 
proxiinate are approximate answers?" and places min- 
imum guarantees over the quality of service measures. 
Moreover, the systein is required to notify t'he quer!- 
owner n;henever the QoS measures are violated. Var- 
ious (QoS) ineasures can be in effect. Sonle of these 
measures are suminarized as follows: 
1 .  Maaim.ization, o,f th,e n.umber of outpu.t tuples. A 
query processor returns a subset of the quer!-'s ex- 
act answer. The lager  t'he returned subset, thc 
less olitput tuples are lost and t,he illore accurate 
the result is. 
2.  Un.iform.ity of the output. A query processor aims 
a,t providing a. subset of the answer that approxi- 
ina.tes a uniforin sample of the exact answer. The 
ret,urned subset should not be skewed towards ail!. 
tuples. Notice that taking a unifornl sa.nlple of tlle 
input, does not iinply that we will obtain a uni- 
forin sample of t . 1 ~  output, e.g., the join opera- 
tion. 
3. Output delay. The difference betsveen the cuirent 
timestamp and the tuple's timestamp represents 
the delay inlposed by the system in the tuple pro- 
cessing. A query processor minimizes the output 
delay to  achieve a better response time. 
5. Design of an Hippocratic Data 
Stream Management System 
Figure 3 illustrat~es the basic coinponents that. in 
our view: should be part, of an HDSMS. \;lie introduce 
several coinponents that are specific to  privacy, such 
as Security an.d Privacy Preferemes, Data. Collection. 
Man.ager. Data Reten,tion. A4an,ager, and View A4an.ager. 
Each of these conlponents plays a role in assuring the 
coinpliance to  priva,cy principles. These conlponents in- 
teract with other components, that are typically part. 
of stream data illanagement systeins, such as Stream 
Registration Un.it, Sum.m.ary Adanager, and QPrery Ad- 
mission. Con,trol to ensure full system security. The ba- 
sic components of an HDShlS are sandwiched between 
two layers of t.he Security Man.ager (input streain and 
output streanl security managers) that provide secu- 
rity services. Such services include encryption, decryp- 
tion, autl~enticat~ion, and 11011-repudiation. Notice that 
integrity is usua.lly not assured for data. streams due to 
the frequent and natural data loss over the communi- 
cat'ion nlediunl in the streanling environment.. The Se- 
c,u,rity Adan.ager is responsible to  achieve the required 
security services. i.e, achieve the safety prin.ciple. 
The stream owner coininunicates with the systein 
through t.wo major interfaces: the Stream. Registration. 
Unit and the Strea.m, A4an.ager. The Stream Registra- 
tion. Un.it accepts Stream Definition. Language (SDL) 
statenlents defining the scllenla of a new streain dong 
n-it11 the privacy preferences of the stream owner. The 
streain owner is allowed to define a view according to 
arhich each user accesses the stream: a,s discussed in 
Section 4.1. Notice that the SDL stat.einents may be 
chailging continuously to  forin a streain of preferences 
that controls the access to  the a.ssociated streain data. 
(as described in Section 4.2). The regist,ration of a new 
streain places no load on the sjat,em because a. stream 
is not pl~ysicall?; read into the systein unless it has an 
associated query. The 1oa.d is imposed a t  the time of 
query registration not a t  the time of stream registra- 
tion. Hence, the system grant,s all the stream registra- 
tion requests unless the streain owner requires secu- 
rity services t,lla.t are not provided by t,he system. The 
Stream Registration. Un.it acquires the purpose of the 
stream data. and the c0n.sen.t of the stream owner be- 
fore a streain is successfully registered in the system. 
The Stream. Manager physically receives the input 
stream tuples and prepares it for further processing in- 
side the system. I t  consists of two basic con~ponents: 
the Buffer Adan,ager and the Summ.ay  Manager. The 
Buffer Mansager accepts t'he newly incoining stream tu- 
ples and inaintains thein in a raw representation while 
the Suillinary hIanager builds stream intermediate rep- 
resentations of the streams that are suitable for query 
processing. The Stream. Man.ager should be eager to 
pus11 the incoming t'uples into t'he systems as soon as 
they anive to  fulfill the accuracy prin,ciple. Also, when 
the systein load is high: t,lle Stream. Man.ager applies 
load shedding techniques to  relieve the system from the 
burden of streain bursts a.rriving at  high rates. How- 
ever: load shedding techniques provide t,he system with 
a uniforin sample of the input streain and abide to  the 
,faithjul representation prin,ciple. 
The system accepts a user's query expressed accord- 
ing to the Stream Man.ipulation. Language (SML),  e.g., 
an SQL query. The Q u e y  Adm.ission. Con,trol Unit ac- 
cepts, rejects, or negotiates a query with the query 
owner ba.sed on (1) the access privileges of the query 
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Figure 3. A preliminary architectural design for a Hippocratic data stream management system 
(2) the current systein load to guarantee a ininiinunl 
QoS for the new query as well as the existing queries. 
The Query Admission. Con.tro1 Un,it fulfills both the lim.- 
ited use and the min.im.um. QoS principles. Once a. query 
is accepted, it is dispa.tched to  the query processor to 
compete for systenl resources. 
The Data Collection Man.ager illaintaiils both the 
privacy preferences of the stream owner and the ac- 
cess requirements of adinitt,ed queries. The Data Col- 
lection. Manager has the following three basic function- 
alities: 
1. It  controls the Stream Man.ger to limit the data col- 
lection to the attributes that  are of interest to out- 
sta.nding queries (1im.ited collection prin.ciple). 
2. I t  contacts the Vzem Manger to establish a view for 
each user or query to hide confidential data from 
unauthorized entities (lzmited use princzple). 
3. It  inforins the Reten.tion. Man,ager of hon. long to 
maintain each piece of collected data (limited re- 
Notice that t,he Data Collection. Man.ager accepts feed- 
ba.ck from the Query Processor to  further prune the 
collection of data. The Data Collection Manager uses 
the feedback of the Query Processor to push global fil- 
t,ers as early as possible a t  the system's input buffers 
(as described in Sectioil 4.5). 
The Data Reten.tion. Man.ageris responsible for delet- 
ing the user's data from the systein once the?; expire 
(i.e.: get outside the 1a.rgest sliding window of inter- 
est) or once t,lley fulfill their associated purpose. Based 
on the maintained security and privacy preferences, 
the Data Collection. Man.ager inforins the Data Reten.- 
tion Man.ager of the expiration time of each data item. 
Whereas t,he Query Processor inforins t,he Data Reten.- 
tion. Man,ager of any data iteins that  have already ful- 
filled its associated purpose. Accordingly~ the Data Re- 
ten.tion. Manager removes these da ta  iteins from tile 
systein input buffers, the suminaries and the opera- 
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The Vzew Manager is interposed betareen the input 
streanls and the  Query Processor to  enforce the privacy 
preferences of the streain owner. Instead of ma.terializ- 
iilg each view: the View Man.ager shares the execution 
of multiple queries on t,he same buffers (as described in 
Section 4.1). The View Adan.ager is responsible for both 
the stream's ra.w input dat,a and its maintained sum- 
ma.ries. Not,ice tha t  the stream o\viler is granted a. view 
with no lirnited access over his own stream t o  follow 
the openn.ess principle. 
The  Query Processor executes the registered contin- 
uous queries over their associated views and streams 
bile result out t.o the query owner. The strealn input 
data  are pushed into the Query Processor by t'he Vzew 
Man.a,ger. Each data. iten1 propagtes up the query plan 
passing through various query plan operators until the 
result is obtained a t  the operator on top of the query 
plan. The  Query Processor records its activities in au- 
dit trails tha t  are available for the  strealn owner t o  
check t.he complian.ce of the system t o  tlle Hippocratic 
principles. 
6. Related Work 
I11 this section, we survey related work in the coil- 
text of da ta  streams through the following t.\vo major 
guidelines: 
(1) JVe survey sevelal prototypes for data  stream 
mallagenlellt systenls tha t  are developed by various re- 
search groups. (2) We highlight tn-o research directions 
that provide security and preserve the privacy of data 
streams. 
Prototype data. streain systems 11a.ve been developed 
t o  address the challenges of streainiilg environments. 
Alt,hough these prototypes do not address dat,a pri- 
vacy as their primary concern: they provide the basic 
fouildation for coiltiiluous query processing over data. 
streams [lo]. St,anford STFU3AAl [9: 251 focuses on re- 
source ina,ilagelnent in the context of data  stream pro- 
cessing. The  AURORA project [l] optinlizes for cer- 
tain QoS measures. Telegraph [13] achieves adaptiv- 
ity in query execution by dynamically cha.nging the or- 
der of query operators during execution. The Niagara 
project [16] performs group optiinizations over sets of 
coiltinuous queries. Gigascope [17] is a data streain sys- 
tem tha t  is developed a t  AT&T to  process streams 
of network traffic. The  Fjord project [24] proposes a 
framework for query executioll plans over dat,a streams. 
The systeiu Ill] introduces a new data type 
for sensors that facilitates query processing over sensor 
data. Nile [23] is a research prototype that  is currently 
being developed a t  Purdue University. Nile extends re- 
latioilal database management SJ-stems with the data 
streaming functionalities. 
Like for traditional databases. the work carried out 
so far t o  assure privacy of data streains call be classi- 
fied into two directions: (1) nlaintaining statistics over 
data stieams and (2) del eloping securit!- mechanisn~s 
for data stream processing. We discuss eacli direction 
brieflj- in the fol1011-ing sections. 
6.1. Maintaining Statistics over Data 
Streams 
To preserve the privacy of individual stream data 
items: queries are allowed to  access only stat,ist.ical in- 
formation over a n~indolv of t,he strealn [18, 311. In ad- 
dition to  privacy requirements, lnaintailliilg statistics 
over data streams was initiated by the need t o  repre- 
sent the stream data. items using low meinory require- 
1nellt.s and t o  provide fast approximate answers using 
a smaller subset of the data.  Streail1 data are sum- 
marized ii~crementall?; as dat.a arrive into the  system. 
Then, queries are performed 011 top of the suininaries 
to  extract. various sta.tist,ics. Although statistics pro- 
vide an illsight of the stream's beha.vior. they blur t,he 
sensitive data of individual data. items. 
Sainpliilg is one of the  solutions to  provide a sinaller 
subset. of data that  faithfully represent the original 
st,rsam. Sampling wit11 a. reservoir techiliques are tuned 
for data  stream processing ill [8]. Various stream oper- 
a.tions? e.g., the join operation [3, 151 and the group- 
by operation [2]: are processed on t,op of a randoin 
sample of the original stream. Sketches [6] are an- 
other form of data suininarization. Some sket,ching 
techniques are developed t o  capture the stream's most 
frequent items [14]. Tlle most frequent. item list can 
represent the streain data. for some special distribu- 
tions: e.g., tlle Zipfian distribution. Several techiliques 
are proposed t o  build approximate l~istograins [21: 261 
and wavelets [12, 301 in a single pass or in few passes to  
fit in the oilliile processing paradigm of data streams. 
6.2. Security Mechanisms for Data Stream 
Processing 
To the best of our kno\vledge, there is very little 
work that addresses tlle security for dat,a. strean1 sys- 
tems and to  date only a preliminary analysis of se- 
curity issues has been uildertaken 151. Although the 
main researcll focus is directed t o  t,he qerfonnance is- 
sues of stream query processing, data st,ream systeins 
can borrow inally security techniques from traditional 
da,tabase systems. For example, ellcryption a.nd decryp- 
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lnent t o  ensure coilfidentiality whenever sensitive data  
is required t o  be protected. In contrast t o  block ciphers. 
stream ciphers fit better in the  streanling environment. 
A preliminary appioach based on such type of cipher 
has been recently proposed to provide a fault toler- 
ant  efficient encryption n~echanism for streain data  [5]. 
However, such a inecl~anisn~ alone is not enough t o  pro- 
vide a coinprehensive solution t o  the  problem of secur- 
ing stream data .  
7. Conclusions and Future Work 
Hippocratic databases extend the  functionalities of 
traditional databases with privacy-preserving capabili- 
ties. Simila.rly, privacy preserving d a t a  strea.in systeins 
are expected t o  be the  next step for the  data  strea.m- 
ing paradigm. I11 this paper, we presented a visionary 
architectural design for HDShIS. We aiined a t  allowing 
privacy preserving capabilibies t o  go hand-in-hand with 
the efficient execution of coiltinuous queries over da ta  
streams. We l~ighliglited soine applica.tions tha t  bene- 
fit from Hippocratic data streain n~a.nagement systems. 
In our design, we adhered to the ten principles of Hip- 
pocratic dat'abases and extended these principles with 
two inore principles t h a t  a.re crucial t o  data  streams. In  
this paper, we identified the  inajor challenges one has 
t,o address in the developnlent of a n  HDSMS and we be- 
lieve that. these challenges will brigger inany directioils 
for fubure resea.rch. The  realization of our design into 
an  initial prototype for a Hippocra,tic d a t a  streain sys- 
ten1 will further provide additional research issues. 
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